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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss coding theorems on a (2, 2)–threshold scheme in the presence of an opponent who
impersonates one of the two participants in an asymptotic setup. We consider a situation where n secrets Sn from
a memoryless source is blockwisely encoded to two shares and the two shares are decoded to Sn with permitting
negligible decoding error. We introduce correlation level of the two shares and characterize the minimum attainable
rates of the shares and a uniform random number for realizing a (2, 2)–threshold scheme that is secure against the
impersonation attack by an opponent. It is shown that, if the correlation level between the two shares equals to an
ℓ ≥ 0, the minimum attainable rates coincide with H(S) + ℓ, where H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and
the maximum attainable exponent of the success probability of the impersonation attack equals to ℓ. We also give
a simple construction of an encoder and a decoder using an ordinary (2, 2)–threshold scheme where the two shares
are correlated and attains all the bounds.
Index Terms
Secret sharing scheme, threshold scheme, impersonation attack, correlated sources, hypothesis testing.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
A secret sharing scheme [1], [2] is a well-known cryptographic technique that enables us to share a secret data
among users. In (t,m)–threshold schemes, for example, a secret S is encoded to m shares, and the m shares are
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Fig. 1. Two (2, 2)–threshold schemes with an opponent
distributed to respective participants. Any t out of m participants can recover S, while t− 1 or fewer participants
cannot obtain any information on S in the sense of unconditional security.
In this paper, we focus on the secret sharing scheme in the presence of opponents. The objective of the opponents
is cheating honest participants. That is, the opponents forge their shares and try to cheat the honest participants by
injecting the forged shares in the recovery phase of S. This problem was firstly discussed by McEliece-Sarwate [3]
and Karnin-Greene-Hellman [4] from the viewpoint of error-correcting codes. In particular, Karnin-Greene-Hellman
[4] and Tompa-Woll [5] clarified that it is impossible to detect cheating in Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [1]. In
addition, a construction of a cheating-detectable secret sharing scheme is proposed in [5] as an extension of Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme although it is much inefficient. So far several schemes have been proposed to overcome such
disadvantages [6]–[9]. In particular, Ogata-Kurosawa-Stinson [8] derived a lower bound on sizes of shares under a
given maximum success probability ε of cheating and the lower bound is attained if and only if a difference set
exists.
In cheating-detectable threshold schemes, the shares must satisfy unforgeablity as well as the ordinary require-
ments as a threshold scheme. We can actually consider two types of attacks, impersonation attacks and substitution
attacks, similarly to the attacks against secret-key authentication systems [10]. In the impersonation attack, opponents
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Fig. 2. A system model of (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks
intend to impersonate participants by injecting forged shares without using the legitimate shares. The impersonation
attack is regarded as successful if the forged shares are accepted in a recovery phase of a secret. On the other hand,
in the substitution attack, some of the participants are malicious and forge their shares by using their shares. The
objective of the malicious participants is cheating honest participants who want to recover S from their shares.
For instance, Figure 1 shows the two types of attacks against a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with two shares X and
Y . We assume that the ordinary requirements as a (2, 2)–threshold schemes, H(S|X) = H(S|Y ) = H(S) and
H(S|XY ) = 0, are satisfied. In Fig. 1(a) an opponent generates a forged share X without using X and Y and
tries to impersonate participant 1 who have a share X . In Fig. 1(b) a participant with X forges X by using X , but
not using Y . We assume that in both cases X is generated probabilistically. Then, it is important to notice that, X
is independent of (X,Y ) in Fig. 1(a), while Y , X and X form a Markov chain in this order in Fig. 1(b). Thus,
considering the two types of attacks against threshold schemes corresponds to giving two kinds of probabilistic
structures for all the shares including the forged share.
Cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes are usually designed to detect substitution attacks [5]–[9] in a non-
asymptotic setup, i.e., the decoding error is not allowed and the block coding is not considered. These studies treat
the case where a coalition of more than one malicious participants generates forged shares. However, there exist
the following drawbacks in cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes:
• According to [8], it is easy to derive the lower bounds of share rates, i.e., information bits per secret needed
to describe shares, under a given success probability of cheating. Unfortunately, however, this result implies
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4that the optimal share rates increase in order at least 1/ε as ε → 0, and hence, an arbitrarily small success
probability of cheating cannot be realized with fixed finite share rates.
• An extension of Shamir’s (t,m)–threshold scheme in [5] can detect both substitution and impersonation attacks.
This scheme is simple but inefficient from the viewpoint of share sizes. In addition, the optimal construction
[8] is based on a combinatoric structure called a difference set, where the difference set exists only in limited
cases and therefore restricts sizes of a secret and shares. Hence, even in a (2, 2)–threshold scheme, we cannot
apply the optimal scheme to a secret S of arbitrarily given size.
• Almost all constructions include the assumption that a secret is generated subject to a uniform probability
distribution. This means that developing a near-optimum cheating-detectable secret sharing scheme for a secret
subject to a non-uniform becomes another problem [9].
In this paper, we focus on the impersonation attack against a (2, 2)–threshold scheme. Since the impersonation
attack is weaker than the substitution attack, the impersonation attack is rarely discussed especially in the framework
of secret sharing schemes. However, if we discuss the threshold scheme secure against impersonation attack in a
certain asymptotic setup, we can unveil another information-theoretic aspect. In fact, we can find connections to
hypothesis testing, authentication codes and Shannon’s cipher system. In a practical point of view, we can consider
a situation where impersonation attack seems to be valid. Suppose that in a (2, 2)–threshold scheme one of the
shares, say X , is a uniform random number that is independent of a secret S. In this case, the participants having
X may generate X subject to a distribution close to the uniform distribution because analysis of X gives almost
no information to the participant.
B. Contribution of This Study
In this paper, we formulate the problem of a threshold scheme secure against impersonation attacks in Shannon-
theoretic asymptotic setup [11], [12], and unveil new features included in the problem. We consider a situation
where n secrets that are generated from a discrete memoryless source are blockwisely encoded to two shares and
the two shares are decoded to n secrets with permitting negligible decoding error. While we consider impersonation
attacks, the asymptotic (2, 2)–threshold scheme treated in this paper has the following features which resolve the
three drawbacks pointed above in cheating-detectable secret sharing schemes:
• An exponentially small success probability of impersonation attack is realized under finite share rates if the
blocklength is sufficiently large.
• The scheme uses no combinatoric structure and is applicable to arbitrary size of a secret.
• The probability distribution of a secret is arbitrary. In addition, the scheme can be applied to a more general
class of sources.
Specifically, we give coding theorems on the (2, 2)–threshold scheme for two cases of blockwise encoding
and symbolwise encoding. In both cases we are interested in the minimum attainable rates for not only the two
shares but also the uniform random number needed to a dealer for realizing a cheating-detectable (2, 2)–threshold
scheme in an asymptotic sense. We also evaluate the maximum attainable exponent of the success probability
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5of the impersonation attack. It turns out that, if the two shares are correlated, we can easily realize the (2, 2)–
threshold scheme in an asymptotic sense that is secure against the impersonation attack. This fact motivates us to
define a notion of correlation level of the two shares as the limit of the normalized mutual information between
the two shares. In a non-asymptotic setup, we note that correlated shares are firstly discussed in [13] based on a
combinatorial argument.
In the case of blockwise encoding, we consider an encoder that encodes n secrets Sn = S1S2 · · ·Sn blockwisely
to two shares Xn and Yn by using a uniform random number Un, where throughout the paper the superscript n
denotes the length and the subscripts n indicate dependency of n. The two shares Xn and Yn are decoded to Sn with
decoding error probability P en that satisfies P en → 0 as n→∞. The two shares are required to satisfy the security
criteria I(Sn;Xn)/n → 0 and I(Sn;Yn)/n → 0 as n → ∞, where I( · ; · ) denotes the mutual information. We
can prove that, if the correlation level of the shares is equal to ℓ, none of the rates of Xn, Yn and Un cannot be
less than H(S) + ℓ, where H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and the exponent of the success probability
of impersonation attack cannot be greater than ℓ (converse part). Furthermore, we can prove the existence of a
symbolwise of pairs of an encoder and a decoder that attains all the bounds shown in the converse part (direct
part). Both the claims of the direct and the converse parts are easily extend to the case where Sn is generated from
a stationary ergodic source.
In the case of symbolwise encoding, we consider an encoder that encodes n secrets Sn to two shares Xn =
X1X2 · · ·Xn and Y n = Y1Y2 · · ·Yn of length n by using n uniform random numbers Un = U1U2 · · ·Un. In fact,
Xn and Y n are generated by (Xi, Yi) = f(Si, Ui) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where f is an arbitrary deterministic encoder
of an ordinary (2, 2)–threshold scheme satisfying H(Si|Xi) = H(Si|Yi) = H(Si) and H(Si|XiYi) = 0. Denote
by g a deterministic map satisfying Si = g(Xi, Yi). We choose an appropriate f so that (Xi, Yi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
can be regarded as i.i.d. correlated random variables. It is shown that we can realize a (2, 2)–threshold scheme in
an asymptotic sense in which P en vanishes as n → ∞, Xn and Y n satisfy a stronger requirement on the secrecy
I(Sn;Xn) = I(Sn;Y n) = 0 and the exponent of the success probability of the impersonation attack is optimal. In
the proof we construct a decoder of Xn and Y n by using g and a one-sided test for verifying the joint typicality
of Xn and Y n. This kind of symbolwise setup is first discussed in [14] for authentication code.
C. Related Works, Organization
The (2, 2)–threshold scheme secure against the impersonation attack is motivated from the Shannon-theoretic
authentication codes [10], [14]–[16]. In particular, in [14] the authors discuss the maximum attainable error exponent
on the success probability of the impersonation attack subject to the vanishing decoding error probability. However,
the results given in this paper is more involved. In fact, in the framework of (2, 2)–threshold schemes we need
to guarantee secrecy of a secret given one of the two shares. In addition, in this paper we succeeded in obtaining
not only such a maximum exponent but also the minimum attainable sizes of the shares and the uniform random
number.
The (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with the blockwise encoder can be viewed
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6as one version of Shannon’s cipher system ( [17]–[21] etc.) when one of the shares is an output from a random
number generator. In a simple asymptotic setup of Shannon’s cipher system [20], n plaintexts Sn generated from
a memoryless source are encrypted to a cryptogram Wn under a key Un and Wn is decrypted to Sn under the
same key Un with permitting decoding error probability P en . The encoder and the decoder are required to satisfy
P en → 0 and I(Sn;Wn)/n → 0 as n → ∞. In this setup, the minimum attainable rates of the cryptogram and
the key coincide with the entropy H(S) of the plaintext. The coding theorems given in this paper imply the same
result under an additional requirement such that the correlation level of Wn and Un is equal to zero, i.e., ℓ = 0.
The (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with the symbolwise encoder is related to
the problem of secret key agreement [21], [22]. In the secret key agreement problem of the source type model [22],
two users have n outputs Xn = X1X2 · · ·Xn ∈ Xn and Y n = Y1Y2 · · ·Yn ∈ Yn from two correlated memoryless
source, respectively, where (Xi, Yi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n are i.i.d. copies of (X,Y ) ∈ X×Y subject to a joint probability
distribution PXY . The two user try to share a nearly uniform random number with the maximum rate I(X ;Y ) by
public communications. On the contrary, the symbolwise encoder in the (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability
of impersonation attacks can be interpreted as a generator of correlated random variables Xn = X1X2 · · ·Xn ∈ Xn
and Y n = Y1Y2 · · ·Yn ∈ Yn given independent random variables Sn and Un, where (Xi, Yi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are
regarded as n i.i.d. copies of (X,Y ) ∼ PXY . Since the correlation level Xn and Y n coincides with I(X ;Y ), the
minimum attainable rate of Un turns out to be H(S) + I(X ;Y ). That is, we need an extra cost of I(X ;Y ) in
order to generate correlated two shares.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of
impersonation attacks with correlation level ℓ in an asymptotic setup is formulated. The coding theorems for the
blockwise encoder are given in Section III. Section IV is devoted to the proofs of the coding theorems. A construction
of encoders and decoders based on a non-asymptotic (2, 2)–threshold scheme and its optimality are discussed in
Section V.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We consider a (2, 2)–threshold scheme depicted in Fig. 2. Assume for an integer n ≥ 1 that a source generates
an n–tuple of secrets Sn = S1S2 · · ·Sn independently subject to a probability distribution PS on a finite set S.
Denote by PSn the probability distribution of Sn induced by PS , and let PSn(sn) be the probability that Sn = sn
for an sn ∈ Sn. Since the source is memoryless, it holds that PSn(sn) =
∏n
i=1 PS(si) for all n ≥ 1 where
sn = s1s2 · · · sn.
In Fig. 2, let Un be the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a finite set Un. Assume that Un
is independent of Sn. In this paper, we use the subscript n to indicate dependency of n, while the superscript n
implies the length. We denote by PUn a probability distribution of Un, i.e., it holds that PUn(un) = 1/|Un| for all
un ∈ Un where | · | denotes the cardinality.
An encoder is defined as a deterministic map ϕn : Sn × Un → Xn × Yn, where Xn and Yn are finite sets in
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7which shares Xn and Yn take values, respectively. Hence, we can write
(Xn, Yn) = ϕn(S
n, Un) (1)
from which we can see that Xn and Yn are also random variables. The joint probability distribution PXnYn of Xn
and Yn is induced from (1). The shares Xn and Yn are distributed securely to participants 1 and 2, respectively.
Next, consider a situation where an opponent may impersonate one of the two participants. When the opponent
impersonates participant 1, the opponent behaves as if he/she were a participant 1 by injecting a forged share
Xn ∈ Xn instead of Xn. This attack is regarded as successful if a decoder fails to detect impersonation attacks
and outputs an element of Sn from Xn and Yn. Here, we assume that the opponent generates Xn without using
Xn. According to [10], [14]–[16], such attack is called impersonation attack as opposed to substitution attack.
Similarly, in the case of deceiving participant 1, the opponent forges a share Y n without using Yn, and tries to
impersonate participant 2. In this case, the attack succeeds when the decoder outputs an element of Sn from Xn
and Y n. Summarizing, letting X˜n and Y˜n be the inputs to a decoder, the following three cases must be considered:
(a0) (X˜n, Y˜n) = (Xn, Yn)
(a1) (X˜n, Y˜n) = (Xn, Yn)
(a2) (X˜n, Y˜n) = (Xn, Y n)
A decoder is defined as a deterministic map ψn : Xn × Yn → Sn ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a symbol to declare the
detection of an impersonated attack, i.e., (a1) or (a2). We note here that the decoder cannot know in advance
which one of (a0)–(a2) actually occurs. On the other hand, we assume that the opponent knows everything about
the encoder and the decoder except for realizations of Sn, Un, Xn and Yn.
In this situation, we define success probabilities of impersonation attacks. Let An ⊂ Xn ×Yn be the region that
the decoder ψn accepts the pair of shares (X˜n, Y˜n) and outputs an element of Sn, i.e.,
An = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : ψn(xn, yn) ∈ Sn}. (2)
Now, recall that the impersonation attack succeeds if the decoder outputs an element of Sn when one of (a1) and
(a2) occurs. In the case of (a1), i.e., the opponent impersonates participant 1, we note that he/she generates a forged
share Xn according to a probability distribution PXn independently from S
n
, Un, Xn, and Yn. In addition, the
opponent tries to optimize PXn so that (Xn, Yn) can be accepted by the decoder with the maximum probability.
This motivates us to define a success probability to impersonate participant 1 by
PXn = max
P
Xn
Pr{(Xn, Yn) ∈ An} (3)
where the maximization of PXn is taken over all probability distributions on Xn, and Pr{·} means the probability
with respect to the (joint) probability distribution of random variable(s) between the parentheses, i.e., (Xn, Yn) ∼
PXnYn = PXnPYn in this case. Similarly, the maximum success probability for the impersonation to participant 2
can be defined as
P Yn = max
P
Y n
Pr{(Xn, Y n) ∈ An} (4)
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8where Pr{·} is taken with respect to (Xn, Y n) ∼ PXnY n = PXnPY n .
The decoding error occurs when Sn is not correctly decoded from legitimate shares in the case of (a0). Hence,
the decoding error probability can be written as
P en = Pr{ψn(ϕn(Sn, Un)) 6= Sn}. (5)
It is easy to see that if (xn, yn) 6∈ An, then ψn(xn, yn) = ⊥ 6∈ Sn. Hence, we have
P en ≥ Pr{(Xn, Yn) 6∈ An} (6)
for any pair of an encoder ϕn and a decoder ψn.
Now, we can define a (2, 2)–threshold scheme in an asymptotic setup as follows:
Definition 1: We say that a sequence {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 of an encoder ϕn and a decoder ψn asymptotically realizes
a (2, 2)–threshold scheme if it satisfies
lim
n→∞
P en = 0 (7)
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Sn;Xn) = lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Sn;Yn) = 0 (8)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information.
The condition (7) guarantees that the decoding error probability is negligible if the blocklength n is sufficiently
large. Note that Fano’s inequality [23, Theorem 2.10.1] tells us that
1
n
H(Sn|XnYn) ≤ 1
n
h(P en) + P
e
n log |S| (9)
where log(·) = log2(·) throughout the paper, and H(·|·) and h(·) are the conditional and the binary entropies,
respectively. Hence, if (7) is satisfied, then we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn|XnYn) = 0 (10)
due to the non-negativity of the conditional entropy. On the other hand, the condition (8) ensures that Sn is secure
against the leakage from one of Xn and Yn if n is sufficiently large. That is, Sn and either one of the shares are
almost independent under such a condition. We also note that, since Sn is generated from a memoryless source,
(8) implies that
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn|Xn) = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn|Yn) = H(S) (11)
where H(·) denotes the entropy.
We conclude this section with introducing a notion of correlation level. The mutual information of two shares
plays a crucial role in detecting impersonation attacks, which will be clarified in the following sections.
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9Definition 2: Let {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=1 be a pair of shares generated by a sequence of encoders {ϕn}∞n=1. Then, a
non-negative number ℓ is said to be a correlation level of {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=0 if it holds that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = ℓ. (12)
In particular, if a sequence {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 of an encoder ϕn and a decoder ψn satisfies Definition 1 and the sequence
of shares {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=0 generated from {ϕn}∞n=1 satisfies (12), we say that {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 asymptotically realizes
a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ.
Remark 1: Note that the sequence {I(Xn;Yn)/n}∞n=1 in (12) does not have a limit in general if {(Xn, Yn)}∞n=1
is generated by an arbitrary sequence of encoders {ϕn}∞n=1. Hence, (12) actually requires the existence of the limit
for the sequence {I(Xn;Yn)/n}∞n=1, and the limit equals to ℓ.
III. CODING THEOREMS FOR A (2, 2)–THRESHOLD SCHEME WITH DETECTABILITY OF IMPERSONATION
ATTACKS
In this section, we give coding theorems for {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 that asymptotically realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme
with correlation level ℓ. We are interested in not only the rates of Xn, Yn and Un but also the exponents of PXn
and P Yn of the sequence {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1. The following theorem is the converse part of the coding theorem with
respect to such rates and exponents.
Theorem 1: For any sequence {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 of an encoder ϕn and a decoder ψn that asymptotically realizes a
(2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ, it holds that
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Xn| ≥ H(S) + ℓ (13)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Yn| ≥ H(S) + ℓ (14)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Un| ≥ H(S) + ℓ (15)
and
lim sup
n→∞
max
{
− 1
n
logPXn ,−
1
n
logP Yn
}
≤ ℓ. (16)
Theorem 1 is proved in Section IV-A. Theorem 1 tells us that for an arbitrarily small γ > 0 the rates of Xn,
Yn and Un cannot be less than H(S) + ℓ− γ for all sufficiently large n, where ℓ is an arbitrarily given correlation
level. In fact, by noticing that H(S) + ℓ ≥ H(S) for any ℓ ≥ 0, the bounds on the right hand sides of (13)–(15)
coincide with the bounds in [12, Theorem 1] for (2, 2)–threshold schemes when ℓ = 0. Theorem 1 also indicates
that the correlation level of shares is an upper bound on the exponents of PXn and PYn .
The direct part of the coding theorem corresponding to Theorem 1 is as follows:
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Theorem 2: For an arbitrarily given non-negative number ℓ ≥ 0, there exists a sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 of
an encoder ϕ∗n and a decoder ψ∗n that asymptotically realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ
satisfying
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Xn| ≤ H(S) + ℓ (17)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Yn| ≤ H(S) + ℓ (18)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Un| ≤ H(S) + ℓ (19)
and
lim inf
n→∞
min
{
− 1
n
logPXn ,−
1
n
logP Yn
}
≥ ℓ. (20)
In particular, the above {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 also satisfies
I(Sn;Xn) = I(S
n;Yn) = 0 for all n ≥ 1 (21)
which is stronger than the condition in (8).
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section IV-B.
Remark 2: Theorem 1 guarantees that {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 in Theorem 2 attains the minimum rates of Xn, Yn, and
Un, and the maximum exponents of PXn and P Yn . Furthermore, the limits exist for these rates and exponents, i.e.,
it holds that
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Xn| = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Yn| = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Un| = H(S) + ℓ (22)
and
lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logPXn = lim
n→∞
− 1
n
logP Yn = ℓ. (23)
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
This section is devoted to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. In the proof of Theorem 1, we use a relationship between
hypothesis testing and the (2, 2)–threshold scheme with detectability of impersonation attacks with correlation level
ℓ, which originates from [16] and developed by [14], [15].
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A. Proof of Theorem 1
Fix ℓ ≥ 0 arbitrarily. We first prove (13). From the basic properties of the entropy and the mutual information,
it holds that
H(Xn) = I(Xn;Yn) +H(Xn|Yn)
≥ I(Xn;Yn) +H(Xn|Yn)−H(Xn|YnSn)
= I(Xn;Yn) + I(Xn;S
n|Yn)
= I(Xn;Yn) +H(S
n|Yn)−H(Sn|XnYn). (24)
Hence, (13) is established because
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Xn| ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Xn)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) + lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn|Yn)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(Sn|XnYn)
= ℓ+H(S) (25)
where the last inequality and the equality are due to (24) and (10)–(12), respectively. We can establish (14) in
essentially the same way.
Next, we prove (15). Since the encoder ϕn is deterministic for each n ≥ 1, we have
H(XnYn) ≤ H(SnUn)
= nH(S) +H(Un) (26)
for all n ≥ 1, where the equality follows because Sn is independent of Un and is generated from a memoryless
source. On the other hand, recalling that
H(XnYn) = H(Xn) +H(Yn)− I(Xn;Yn) (27)
it follows from (26) and (27) that
1
n
log |Un| = 1
n
H(Un)
≥ 1
n
H(XnYn)−H(S)
≥ 1
n
{H(Xn) +H(Yn)− I(Xn;Yn)} −H(S) (28)
for all n ≥ 1, where the first equality follows from the uniformity of Un ∈ Un. Therefore, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Un| ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Xn) + lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Yn)− lim sup
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Yn)−H(S)
≥ H(S) + ℓ (29)
where the last inequality follows from (12) and (25). Note that we have lim infn→∞H(Yn) ≥ H(S) + ℓ in the
same way as (25).
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To prove (16), we use the fact that the decoding error probability and the success probabilities of impersonation
attack in a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ are closely related to the error probabilities of the first
kind and the second kind in hypothesis testing, respectively, which is pointed out in [14]–[16]. Let us consider a
simple hypothesis test with the following two hypotheses:
H0 : (X˜n, Y˜n) ∼ PXnYn (30)
H1 : (X˜n, Y˜n) ∼ PXnPYn . (31)
Let An ⊂ Xn ×Yn denote an acceptance region for the null hypothesis H0. Then, the error probability of the first
kind and the error probability of the second kind of the above hypothesis testing are given by
αn
def
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈Acn
PXnYn(xn, yn) = Pr {(Xn, Yn) 6∈ An} (32)
βn
def
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈An
PXn(xn)PYn(yn) (33)
where Acn denotes the complement set of An. It is easy to see from (6) that P en ≥ αn holds for any n ≥ 1. Hence,
in view of (7), we have
lim
n→∞
αn = 0. (34)
Furthermore, it follows from (3) that
PXn = max
P
Xn
Pr{(Xn, Yn) ∈ An}
= max
P
Xn
∑
(xn,yn)∈An
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
≥ βn. (35)
Similarly, we also have P Yn ≥ βn. Therefore, it holds that
− 1
n
log βn ≥ max
{
− 1
n
logPXn ,−
1
n
logP Yn
}
for all n ≥ 1. (36)
According to [24, Theorem 4.4.1] and [14, Theorem 2], we have
I(Xn;Yn) =
∑
(xn,yn)
∈Xn×Yn
PXnYn(xn, yn) log
PXnYn(xn, yn)
PXn(yn)PYn(yn)
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈An
PXnYn(xn, yn) log
PXnYn(xn, yn)
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
+
∑
(xn,yn)∈Acn
PXnYn(xn, yn) log
PXnYn(xn, yn)
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
≥
(∑
An
PXnYn(xn, yn)
)
log
∑
An
PXnYn(xn, yn)∑
An
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
+

∑
Acn
PXnYn(xn, yn)

 log
∑
Acn
PXnYn(xn, yn)∑
Acn
PXn(xn)PYn(yn)
= (1− αn) log 1− αn
βn
+ αn log
αn
1− βn
= −h(αn)− (1 − αn) log βn − αn log(1− βn)
≥ −h(αn)− (1 − αn) log βn (37)
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where the first inequality follows from the log sum inequality, and the second inequality holds because −αn log(1−
βn) ≥ 0. Hence, it follows from (36) and (37) that
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) ≥ −h(αn)
n
+ (1 − αn)max
{
− 1
n
logPXn ,−
1
n
logP Yn
}
for all n ≥ 1. (38)
Therefore, we have (16) by taking the limit superior of both sides of (38) and noticing (34). 
Remark 3: The claim of Theorem 1 can be easily extended to the case where Sn is generated from a stationary
source. For the case of the stationary source, the entropy H(S) in the statement of Theorem 1 is replaced with
the entropy rate H def= limn→∞H(Sn)/n. By recalling the existence of the limit of {H(Sn)/n}∞n=1 [23, Theorem
4.2.1], we can easily check that both the left hand sides of (25) and (29) are bounded by H + ℓ.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We choose arbitrarily a sequence {γn}∞n=1 of positive numbers that satisfies limn→∞ γn = 0 and limn→∞
√
nγn =
∞. Let Tγn be the typical set defined by
Tγn =
{
sn ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣ 1n log 1PSn(sn) −H(S)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γn
}
. (39)
Then, it is well-known that (e.g., see [23, Theorem 3.1.2]) Tγn satisfies the following properties:
lim
n→∞
Pr{Sn ∈ Tγn} = 1 (40)
|Tγn | ≤ 2n{H(S)+γn} for all n ≥ 1. (41)
For an arbitrary ℓ ≥ 0, let Ln def= {0, 1, . . . , Ln − 1} and Mn def= {0, 1, . . . ,Mn − 1} be sets of integers where
Ln
def
= ⌊2nℓ⌋ and Mn def= |Tγn |.
In the following, we construct a sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 of an encoder ϕ∗n and a decoder ψ∗n that asymptotically
realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ satisfying |Xn| = |Yn| = |Un| = Ln(Mn + 1).
The encoder ϕ∗n can be constructed as follows: Since Mn = |Tγn |, there exists a bijection ξn : Tγn → Mn.
Furthermore, define a map ξ+n : Sn →M+n where M+n def= Mn ∪ {Mn} by
ξ+n (s
n) =

 ξn(s
n), if sn ∈ Tγn
Mn, otherwise
(42)
and let Zn
def
= ξ+n (S
n). Denote by ULn and UMn the random variables subject to the uniform distribution on Ln and
M+n , respectively, and define Un = (ULn , UMn ). In addition, we define two shares by
Xn =
(
XLn , X
M
n
)
=
(
ULn , Zn ⊖ UMn
) ∈ Ln ×M+n (43)
Yn =
(
ULn , U
M
n
) ∈ Ln ×M+n (44)
where ⊖ represents the subtraction of modulo Mn + 1.
Next, let us define the decoder ψ∗n. Let xn = (xLn , xMn ) ∈ Ln ×M+n and yn = (yLn , yMn ) ∈ Ln ×M+n be the
inputs to the decoder. Then, the decoder ψ∗n first checks whether xLn = yLn holds or not. If xLn 6= yLn , the decoder
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judges that impersonation attack has occurred and outputs ⊥. On the other hand, if xLn = yLn , the decoder computes
xMn ⊕ yMn , where ⊕ denotes the addition of modulo Mn+1. If xMn ⊕ yMn = Mn, the decoder outputs ⊥ since the
decoding error occurs in such a case. Otherwise, the decoder outputs ξ−1n (xMn ⊕ yMn ) where ξ−1n :Mn → Tγn is
the inverse map of ξn. Summarizing, the decoder ψ∗n is written as
ψ∗n(xn, yn) =

 ξ
−1
n (x
M
n ⊕ yMn ), if xLn = yLn and xMn ⊕ yMn 6=Mn are satisfied
⊥, otherwise
(45)
and the acceptance region of ψ∗n is given by
An = {(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : xLn = yLn and xMn ⊕ yMn ∈Mn}. (46)
Hereafter, we prove that the above sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 realizes the optimal (2, 2)–threshold scheme with
correlation level ℓ that asymptotically attains all the bounds in (17)–(20). It suffices to prove Claims 1–5 below.
Claim 1: For an arbitrarily small γ > 0, the rates of Xn, Yn and Un cannot be less than H(S) + ℓ − γ for all
sufficiently large n, i.e., (17)–(19) hold.
Claim 2: The limit inferior of the minimum exponent in the success probabilities of impersonation attacks is at
least ℓ, i.e., (20) holds.
Claim 3: The decoding error probability for the legitimate shares vanishes as n goes to infinity, i.e., (7) holds.
Claim 4: For all n ≥ 1, the n source outputs Sn are secure against the leakage from one of Xn and Yn, i.e.,
(21) holds.
Claim 5: The correlation level between Xn and Yn equals to ℓ, i.e., (12) holds.
Proof of Claim 1: In order to evaluate the share rates and the randomness given by (17)–(19), observe that
log |Xn| = log |Yn| = log |Un|
= log{Ln(Mn + 1)}
= log
{⌊2nℓ⌋(|Tγn |+ 1)}
≤ n{H(S) + ℓ+ γn}+ 1 (47)
where the last inequality follows from (41). Hence, it holds that
1
n
log |Xn| = 1
n
log |Yn| = 1
n
log |Un| ≤ H(S) + ℓ+ γn + 1
n
. (48)
Taking the limit superior of both sides in (48), Claim 1 is established. 
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Proof of Claim 2: We evaluate PXn in the following way:
PXn = max
PXn
Pr
{
(Xn, Yn) ∈ An
}
= max
P
Xn
Pr
{
X
L
n = Y
L
n and X
M
n ⊕ YMn ∈ Tγn
}
≤ max
P
Xn
Pr
{
X
L
n = Y
L
n
}
= max
P
X
L
n
Pr
{
X
L
n = U
L
n
}
(a)
= max
P
XLn
∑
xLn∈Ln
P
X
L
n
(xLn )PULn (x
L
n )
(b)
=
1
Ln
max
P
XLn
∑
xLn∈Ln
P
X
L
n
(xLn ) =
1
Ln
(49)
where Xn
def
= (X
L
n , X
M
n ) ∈ Ln×M+n and Yn def= (Y Ln , YMn ) = (ULn , UMn ) ∈ Ln×M+n , and the marked equalities
follow from the following reasons:
(a) XLn and ULn are independent.
(b) PULn (xLn ) = 1/Ln holds for all xLn ∈ Ln.
Similarly, noticing the fact that XLn = ULn , we also have P Yn ≤ 1/Ln, and therefore, we conclude that
lim inf
n→∞
min
{
− 1
n
logPXn ,−
1
n
logP Yn
}
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logLn = ℓ. (50)

Proof of Claim 3: Since every legitimate pair (xn, yn) ∈ An of shares is decoded by ϕ∗n without error, the
decoding error happens only if the decoder ψ∗n outputs ⊥ for a pair of legitimate shares (xn, yn). Hence, the
decoding error probability P en can be written as
P en = Pr{ψ∗n(Xn, Yn) =⊥}
= Pr{ξ+n (Sn) =Mn}
= Pr{Sn 6∈ Tγn}.
Therefore, it follows from (40) that limn→∞ P en = 1− limn→∞ Pr{Sn ∈ Tγn} = 0. 
Proof of Claim 4: First, we note that Zn and XMn = Zn ⊖ UMn are independent because of non-negativity of
the mutual information and
I(Zn;Zn ⊖ UMn ) = H(Zn) +H(Zn ⊖ UMn )−H(Zn, Zn ⊖ UMn )
= H(Zn) +H(Zn ⊖ UMn )−H(Zn, UMn )
= H(Zn ⊖ UMn )−H(UMn )
≤ 0 (51)
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where the last inequality holds because Zn ⊖ UMn ∈M+n and UMn is subject to the uniform distribution on M+n .
Hence, Zn and Xn = (XLn , XMn ) are also independent because
I(Zn;Xn) = I(Zn;X
L
nX
M
n )
= I(Zn;X
M
n ) + I(Zn;X
L
n |XMn )
= 0 (52)
where the last equality follows since I(Zn;XMn ) = 0, and Zn, XMn , and XLn form a Markov chain in this order.
In order to show (21), it is sufficient to prove that I(Sn;Xn) = 0 for all n ≥ 1 because I(Sn;Yn) = 0 for
any n ≥ 1 trivially holds from the fact that Sn and Yn = (ULn , UMn ) are independent. In addition, I(Sn;Xn) = 0
is established from I(Sn;Xn) ≤ I(Zn;Xn) = 0 which is obtained by the information processing inequality [23,
Theorem 2.8.1] for a Markov chain Sn → Zn → Xn, and recalling (52). 
Proof of Claim 5: The correlation level can be evaluated as follows. Note that the mutual information of shares
Xn and Yn satisfies
I(Xn;Yn) = I(X
L
nX
M
n ;Y
L
n Y
M
n )
= I(ULnX
M
n ;U
L
n U
M
n )
= H(ULnX
M
n )−H(XMn |ULn UMn )−H(ULn |XMn ULn UMn )
(c)
= H(ULn ) +H(X
M
n )−H(XMn |UMn )
(d)
= H(ULn ) +H(X
M
n )−H(Zn) (53)
where the marked equalities hold because of the following reasons:
(c) ULn and XMn are independent, and ULn , UMn , and XMn form a Markov chain in this order.
(d) It follows that H(XMn |UMn ) = H
(
Zn ⊖ UMn |UMn
)
= H
(
Zn|UMn
)
= H (Zn) due to the independence of
Sn and Un.
Hereafter, we evaluate the terms on the right hand side of (53). It is easy to see that
H(ULn ) = logLn = log⌊2nℓ⌋. (54)
The second term in the right hand side of (53) can be evaluated as
H(XMn ) ≤ log(Mn + 1)
= log(|Tγn |+ 1)
≤ n{H(S) + γn}+ 1 (55)
where the last inequality follows from (41). In order to evaluate the last term on the right hand side of (53), we set
δn = Pr{ξ+n (Sn) = Mn} = Pr{Sn 6∈ Tγn}. Clearly, limn→∞ δn = 0 from (40). Since the map ξn : Tγn →Mn is
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bijective, we have
H(Zn) = H(ξ
+
n (S
n))
=
∑
sn∈Tγn
PSn(s
n) log
1
PSn(sn)
+ δn log
1
δn
≥
∑
sn∈Tγn
PSn(s
n)n{H(S)− γn} − δn log δn
= (1 − δn)n{H(S)− γn} − δn log δn (56)
where the inequality holds because of (41). Hence, we have from (55) and (56) that
H(XMn )−H(Zn) ≤ nδnH(S) + n(2− δn)γn + δn log δn + 1. (57)
On the other hand, it is easy to see with the same reason for the equality (d) in (53) that
H(XMn )−H(Zn) ≥ H(XMn |UMn )−H(Zn) = 0. (58)
Summarizing, we have from (53), (54), (57), and (58) that
1
n
log⌊2nℓ⌋ ≤ 1
n
I(Xn;Yn) ≤ 1
n
log⌊2nℓ⌋+ δnH(S) + (2− δn)γn + 1
n
(δn log δn + 1) . (59)
By taking the limit of both sides of (59) and noticing that limn→∞ γn = limn→∞ δn = 0, we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = ℓ. (60)

Since Claims 1–5 are verified, Theorem 2 is proved. 
Remark 4: The claim of Theorem 2 is valid for the class of stationary ergodic sources if the entropy H(S) in
Theorem 2 is replaced with the entropy rate H def= limn→∞H(Sn)/n. This fact is obtained by a slight modification
of the proof of Theorem 2 followed by the diagonal line argument [25, Theorem 1.8.2]. First, by the asymptotic
equipartition property [23, Theorem 3.1.2], we have
lim
n→∞
Pr{Sn ∈ Tn,γ} = 1 (61)
for any constant γ > 0, where
Tn,γ def=
{
sn ∈ Sn :
∣∣∣∣ 1n log 1PSn(sn) −H
∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ
}
(62)
and H denotes the entropy rate of the source. We construct an encoder ϕ∗n,γ and a decoder ψ∗n,γ in the same way as
in the proof of Theorem 2. It is easily checked that {(ϕ∗n,γ , ψ∗n,γ)}∞n=1 asymptotically realizes the (2, 2)–threshold
scheme. In addition, by the same argument with (48) and (59), {(ϕ∗n,γ , ψ∗n,γ)}∞n=1 satisfies
1
n
log |Xn| = 1
n
log |Yn| = 1
n
log |Un| ≤ H + ℓ+ γ + 1
n
(63)
and
1
n
log⌊2nℓ⌋ ≤ 1
n
I(Xn;Yn) ≤ 1
n
log⌊2nℓ⌋+ δn,γH + (2 − δn,γ)γ + 1
n
(δn,γ log δn,γ + 1) (64)
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where δn,γ
def
= Pr{Sn /∈ Tn,γ} → 0 as n→∞. Note that (64) implies that∣∣∣∣ 1nI(Xn;Yn)− ℓ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3γ for all n ≥ N0(γ). (65)
We now fix a sequence {γm}∞m=1 satisfying γ0 > γ1 > · · · > γm > · · · > 0 arbitrarily and define N0 =
1 and Nm, m = 1, 2, . . . , as the minimum integer N satisfying | I(Xn;Yn)/n − ℓ | ≤ 3γm for all n ≥ N .
Obviously, {Nm}∞m=1 is monotone nondecreasing. We define (ϕ∗n, ψ∗n) as (ϕ∗n,γ0 , ψ∗n,γ0) for each 1 ≤ n < N1 and
(ϕ∗n,γm , ψ
∗
n,γm
) for each Nm ≤ n < Nm+1, m = 1, 2, . . .. Then, in view of (63), (65) and γm ↓ 0 as m→∞, we
can conclude that {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 satisfies
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Xn| = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Yn| = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Un| ≤ H + ℓ (66)
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Xn;Yn) = ℓ. (67)
V. ANOTHER OPTIMAL SCHEME USING SYMBOLWISE ENCODING
In Section III, we have shown by using blockwise coding that the sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 of an encoder
and a decoder realizes the asymptotically optimal (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ. In addition,
{(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 also attains the maximum exponent in the success probabilities of impersonation attack which is
given by ℓ. In this section, by using a symbolwise encoding, we give a simple construction of {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 that
realizes the asymptotically optimal (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ and the exponent in the success
probability of impersonation attacks equals to ℓ. In this construction, we use a pair (f, g) of an encoder f and a
decoder g for a (2, 2)–threshold scheme for a single source output S. In addition, a one-sided test is used to detect
the impersonation attacks.
Let S,U,X and Y be random variables of a secret, a random number, and two shares taking values in finite
sets S,U ,X and Y respectively. For a non-negative number ℓ, we first define a pair (f, g) of an encoder f and
a decoder g for a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ. That is, the encoder f : S × U → X × Y is
defined to be a deterministic map satisfying
H(S|X) = H(S|Y ) = H(S) (68)
H(S|XY ) = 0 (69)
in addition to
I(X ;Y ) = ℓ (70)
where shares X and Y are determined by (X,Y ) = f(S,U). Note that (68) and (69) are the ordinary requirements
for (2, 2)–threshold schemes, i.e., (68) guarantees that any information of S does not leak from either one of the
shares, and (69) implies that the secret S can be decoded from X and Y without error. Hence, let g : X×Y → S∪{λ}
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be a decoder corresponding to f and satisfying g(x, y) = λ for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y that does not belong to the
range of f . Furthermore, (70) means that the correlation level of X and Y generated by the encoder f is equal to
ℓ. We say that a pair (f, g) of an encoder f and a decoder g realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation
level ℓ in the non-asymptotic sense if (f, g) satisfies (68)–(70). In addition, it is shown in [26] that
min { |X |, |Y|, |U| } ≥ |S| (71)
must be satisfied for any encoder of (2, 2)–threshold schemes satisfying (68) and (69). Hence, we also impose (71)
on f in addition to (68)–(70).
In this setting, we define an encoder ϕ∗n : Sn×Un → Xn×Yn as the repeated application of f : S×U → X ×Y
to (Si, Ui), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which can be written as
ϕ∗n(s
n, un)
def
= f(s1, u1)f(s2, u2) · · · f(sn, un) (72)
where sn def= s1s2 · · · sn ∈ Sn and un def= u1u2 · · ·un ∈ Un are n secrets and n random numbers, respectively.
Hence, the two shares Xn = X1X2 · · ·Xn ∈ Xn and Y n = Y1Y2 · · ·Yn ∈ Yn are i.i.d. copies of X and Y ,
respectively, where (Xi, Yi) = f(Si, Ui).
Furthermore, we define
A∗n =
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn : 1
n
log
PXY (x
n, yn)
PXn(xn)PY n(yn)
> I(X ;Y )− γn
}
(73)
where γn is an arbitrary sequence of positive integers {γn}∞n=1 satisfying limn→∞ γn = 0 and limn→∞
√
nγn =∞.
Then, legitimate shares belong to A∗n with high probability if n is sufficiently large since
lim
n→∞
Pr{(Xn, Y n) ∈ A∗n} = 1 (74)
holds from the law of large numbers. Hence, we regard the received shares as legitimate if they belong to A∗n, and
decode them by the decoder gn corresponding to the encoder ϕ∗n in (72), where gn can be written as
gn(x
n, yn)
def
= g(x1, y1)g(x2, y2) · · · g(xn, yn). (75)
In addition, the decoder ψ∗n : Xn × Yn → Sn ∪ {⊥} is defined by
ψ∗n(x
n, yn) =

 gn(x
n, yn), if (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n
⊥, otherwise
(76)
where ⊥ means that the impersonation attack, i.e., (a1) or (a2) in Section II, is detected.
According to (74), every (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n satisfies PXnY n(xn, yn) > 0, which is equivalent to PXY (xi, yi) > 0,
i.e., g(xi, yi) 6= λ, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Hence, for every (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n, there uniquely exists sn ∈ Sn that
satisfies gn(xn, yn) = sn whether the received shares xn and yn are legitimate or not. Furthermore, if the pair of
shares (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n is legitimate, the secret is reproduced without error due to the definitions of f and ϕ∗n. More
precisely, ψ∗n(xn, yn) = gn(xn, yn) = sn holds for every un ∈ Un, sn ∈ Sn, xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn satisfying
ϕ∗n(s
n, un) = (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n.
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The above sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 defined by (72) and (76) realizes an asymptotic (2, 2)–threshold scheme
with correlation level ℓ.
Theorem 3: Let (f, g) be any pair of an encoder and a decoder that realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with
correlation level ℓ in the non-asymptotic sense. Then, the sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 defined by (72) and (76) satisfies
for all n ≥ 1 that
P en = Pr{(Xn, Y n) 6∈ A∗n} (77)
H(Sn|Xn) = H(Sn|Y n) = H(Sn) (78)
I(Xn;Y n) = nℓ (79)
which obviously realizes an asymptotic (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ. In addition, this {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1
satisfies (20).
Proof of Theorem 3: First, we prove (77). If there is a one-to-one correspondence between (sn, un) and (xn, yn),
(77) is obvious. We show that (77) holds for any pair of f and g satisfying (68) and (69) which does not guarantee
the existence of such a one-to-one correspondence.
Define
D∗n(xn, yn) = {(sn, un) : ϕ∗n(sn, un) = (xn, yn) and ψ∗n(xn, yn) = sn}. (80)
Recalling that ψ∗n(xn, yn) = gn(xn, yn) = sn for every un ∈ Un, sn ∈ Sn, xn ∈ Xn and yn ∈ Yn satisfying
ϕ∗n(s
n, un) = (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n, it holds for all (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n that
Dn(xn, yn) = {(sn, un) : ϕ∗n(sn, un) = (xn, yn) and gn(xn, yn) = sn}
= {(sn, un) : ϕ∗n(sn, un) = (xn, yn)}
def
= ϕ∗n
−1(xn, yn) (81)
where ϕ∗n
−1(xn, yn) means the inverse image of (xn, yn).
Next, we define
Dn = {(sn, un) : ψ∗n(ϕ∗n(sn, un)) = sn}. (82)
Then, since ψ∗n(xn, yn) =⊥ for all (xn, yn) 6∈ A∗n and sn is reproduced without error from every (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n,
we have
Dn =
⋃
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
Dn(xn, yn)
=
⋃
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
ϕ∗n
−1(xn, yn) (83)
where the second equality follows from (81). Furthermore, since ϕ∗n is deterministic, it is easy to see that
ϕ∗n
−1(xn, yn) ∩ ϕ∗n−1(x˜n, y˜n) = ∅ for all (xn, yn) 6= (x˜n, y˜n). (84)
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From (83) and (84), it is shown that {ϕ∗n−1(xn, yn)}(xn,yn)∈A∗n is a partition of Dn. Therefore, we have
1− P en =
∑
(sn,un)∈Dn
PSnUn(s
n, un).
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
∑
(sn,un)∈ϕ∗n
−1(xn,yn)
PSnUn(s
n, un)
=
∑
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
PXnY n(x
n, yn)
= Pr{(Xn, Y n) ∈ A∗n} (85)
where the first equality comes from the definition of the decoding error probability and the third equality is due
to the definition of PXnY n(·, ·), i.e., PXnY n(xn, yn) =
∑
(sn,un)∈Sn×Un:ϕ∗n(s
n,un)=(xn,yn) PSnEn(s
n, un). Hence,
we obtain (77). It is easy to see from (74) that P en satisfies (7) i.e., the decoding error probability of ψ∗n in (76)
vanishes as n goes to infinity.
In order to establish Theorem 3, it remains to show that {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 satisfies (20). Note that (78) and (79)
clearly hold from (68) and (70), respectively. To this end, we evaluate the success probability of the impersonation
attack as follows:
PXn = max
PXn
Pr
{
(X
n
, Y n) ∈ A∗n
}
= max
P
Xn
∑
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
PXn(x
n)PY n(y
n)
≤ max
P
Xn
∑
(xn,yn)∈A∗n
PXn(x
n)
PXnY n(x
n, yn)
PXn(xn)
2−n(ℓ−γn)
≤ max
PXn
∑
(xn,yn)
∈Xn×Yn
PXn(x
n)
PXnY n(x
n, yn)
PXn(xn)
2−n(ℓ−γn)
= 2−n(ℓ−γn) (86)
where the first inequality follows from (73) which implies
PY n(y
n) <
PXnY n(x
n, yn)
PXn(xn)
2−n{I(X;Y )−γn}
=
PXnY n(x
n, yn)
PXn(xn)
2−n(ℓ−γn) (87)
for any (xn, yn) ∈ A∗n. Similarly, we have P Yn ≤ 2−n(ℓ−γn). Hence, we obtain (20) since limn→∞ γn = 0. 
Since Theorem 3 has been proved, we are now interested in a relation between the share rates and the correlation
level attained by a pair (f, g) of an encoder f and a decoder g, which is given by the following claim:
Claim 6: Let M and MS be arbitrary positive integers satisfying M ≥ MS . Then, there exists a pair (f∗, g∗)
of an encoder f∗ and a decoder g∗ for a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with correlation level ℓ = logM −H(S) in the
non-asymptotic sense satisfying |X | = |Y| = |U| = M and |S| = MS .
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Remark 5: According to Claim 6, the rates of shares and randomness are log |X | = log |Y| = log |U| = logM =
H(S)−ℓ, which coincides with the lower bounds of the rates given by (17)–(19). Hence, the sequence {(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1
defined by (72) and (76) also achieves all the bounds in Theorem 2. Observe that the sequence of encoders {ϕ∗n}∞n=1
in this section is simpler than the the sequence of encoders presented in Theorems 2. For instance, Sn cannot be
encoded symbolwisely by the sequence of encoders in the proof of Theorem 2 since the correlation of two shares
is generated by the random variable ULn in both shares contained in common. On the other hand, symbolwise
encoding is possible by the sequence of encoders in this section since Xi and Yi are correlated due to f for every
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, such symbolwise encoding also enables us that I(Si;Xi) = I(Si;Yi) = 0 for every
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which is stronger than the security condition given by (21) in Theorem 2.
However, we note that M , MS and the correlation level ℓ cannot be set arbitrarily in Claim 6 although they can
be taken arbitrarily in Theorem 2, which is compensation for the simplicity.
Remark 6: In the threshold scheme with detectability of substitution attacks in a non-asymptotic setup (e.g.,
[3]–[8]), it is shown that any ideal secret sharing scheme cannot detect any forgery of shares with probability 1.
Furthermore, as is shown in [26], we note that the ideal secret sharing schemes can be realized if and only if
|X | = |Y| = |S| and S is uniformly distributed.
Similarly, in the asymptotic setup discussed in this section, it is impossible for any (f, g) of an ideal (2, 2)–
threshold scheme to achieve PXn and P Yn with exponential order of n because the correlation level logM−H(S) = 0
is satisfied if and only if M = |S| and S is uniformly distributed. On the other hand, we note that ℓ is positive for
arbitrary distribution of S if min { |X |, |Y|, |U| } > |S|. 
Proof of Claim 6: From (71), let us define
X = Y = U = {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} (88)
S = {0, 1, . . . ,MS − 1} (89)
where M ≥MS . Define the encoder f∗ : S × U → X × Y for a secret s ∈ S and a random number u ∈ U as
f∗(s, u) = (s⊖ u, u) (90)
where ⊖ denotes the subtraction of modulo M . Then, the corresponding decoder g∗ : X × Y → S ∪ {λ} can be
written as
g∗(x, y) =

 x⊕ y, if x⊕ y ∈ Sλ, otherwise (91)
where ⊕ represents the addition of modulo M . Note that the secret s can be decoded by g∗ without error, and
hence, (69) is satisfied. Furthermore, we can check that a pair of the shares (X,Y ) is generated according to the
conditional probability distribution
PXY |S(x, y|s) =

 1/M, if s = x⊕ y ∈ S0, otherwise (92)
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if we apply the encoder f∗ defined in (90) to the secret S with an arbitrary probability distribution PS(·). Hence,
the following discussion holds for an arbitrary distribution on S. This idea is based on the secret sharing scheme
for non-uniform secret distribution studied in [26].
We show that (68) is satisfied by X and Y generated by f∗. For every fixed x ∈ X and s ∈ S, we can check
that there exists a unique y ∈ Y , satisfying s = g∗(x, y). Hence, it holds from (92) that
PX|S(x|s) =
∑
y∈Y
PXY |S(x, y|s)
=
1
M
(93)
for every (x, s) ∈ X × S. Then, we have
PX(x) =
∑
s∈S
PX|S(x|s)PS(s)
=
∑
s∈S
1
M
· PS(s)
=
1
M
. (94)
From (93) and (94), it is shown that S and X are statistically independent. Similarly, it can be shown that S and
Y are statistically independent, and hence, (68) is proved.
The correlation level of X and Y generated by f∗ can be calculated as follows. We note that
H(XY )
(e)
= H(US)
(f)
= H(U) +H(S)
= logM +H(S) (95)
where the marked equalities (e) and (f) hold since
(e) there exists a bijection between U × S and X × Y .
(f) U and S are statistically independent.
Therefore, we obtain from (94) and (95) that
I(X ;Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY )
= 2 logM − {logM +H(S)}
= logM −H(S). (96)
Hence, it is shown that the pair (f∗, g∗) of the encoder and the decoder actually realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme
with correlation level logM −H(S). 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is concerned with coding theorems for a (2, 2)–threshold scheme in the presence of an opponent who
impersonates one of the participants. We have considered an asymptotic setup of the (2, 2)–threshold scheme in
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which n secrets from a memoryless source are encoded to two shares by using a uniform random number, and the
two shares are decoded to the n secrets with permitting negligible decoding error probability. We have investigated
the minimum attainable rates of the two shares and the uniform random number, and the maximum exponents of
the probabilities of the successful impersonation from a Shannon-theoretic viewpoint. We have presented coding
theorems for two cases of encoding, i.e., blockwise and symbolwise encoding.
In the first case, we have considered the situation where the n secrets are encoded blockwisely to two shares. We
have defined the correlation level ℓ ≥ 0 of the shares as the limit of the normalized mutual information between
the two shares. In the converse part it is shown that for any sequence {(ϕn, ψn)}∞n=1 of pairs of an encoder ϕn
and a decoder ψn that asymptotically realizes a (2, 2)–threshold scheme with the correlation level ℓ, none of the
rates can be less than H(S)+ ℓ, where H(S) denotes the entropy of the source, and the exponent of the probability
of the successful impersonation cannot be less than ℓ. In addition, we have shown the existence of a sequence
{(ϕ∗n, ψ∗n)}∞n=1 of pairs of an encoder ϕ∗n and a decoder ψ∗n that attains all the bounds given in the converse part.
The obtained results can be easily extended to the case where the n secrets are generated from a stationary ergodic
source.
In the second case, we have considered the situation where the n secrets are encoded symbolwisely to two shares
of length n by repeatedly applying the encoder of an ordinary (2, 2)–threshold scheme to the n secrets. While
the above converse part is valid in this setup, we can give another interesting decoder in the direct part. That is,
we have shown that the impersonation by an opponent can be verified with probability close to one by verifying
the joint typicality of the two shares. It turns out that these encoder and decoder also attain all the bounds in the
converse part.
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